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COMMENTS
dealing with legislation on this subject, continue to restrict its
application by means of strict construction and a reading in of
older provisions. As the statute which has been so restricted
seems to be drafted with a view toward broader application than
it is presently being given, it is not unlikely that it will undergo
a revision in the near future, such change providing a tool which
should prove useful in the solution of a vexing social and eco-
nomic problem in our state.
Jerry Simon
Creditors' Remedies Against Holders
of Watered Stock
Watered stock has been traditionally defined as "stock which
is issued by a corporation as fully paid-up stock, when in fact
the whole amount of the par value thereof has not been paid
in." 1 The term includes "bonus shares," "discount shares," shares
issued for over-valued services or property, and other forms of
shares issued for a fictitious consideration. It should be kept in
mind that in the watered stock situation there is no outstanding
promise to pay as in the case of an unpaid subscription.2 Hence,
any action against the stockholder must be ex delicto or based
on statutory liability.
Since the passage of the corporation act in 19283 there have
been no reported Louisiana cases on the liability of holders of
watered stock to creditors. Necessarily, our subject will be
limited to a discussion of the different theories of liability in
other jurisdictions, the basis for liability in Louisiana before1928, and the writer's views on which theory should be used by
our courts today.
I. THEORIES OF LiABILITY IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. The Trust Fund Theory
The leading case of Scovill v. Thayer4 involved an agree-
ment between a shareholder and a corporation whereby the
latter issued fully paid stock at a discount with a provision that
1. Black, Law Dictionary (3 ed. 1933).
2. Gray Construction Co. v. Fantle, 62 S.D. 345, 253 N.W. 464 (1934); 13
Am. Jur., Corporations § 563 (1934). See La. R.S. (1950) 12:15.
3. La. Act 250 of 1928, now La. R.S. (1950) 12:1-71.
4. 105 U.S. 143 (1881).
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the stockholder would not be held for any additional assessment.
The Supreme Court of the United States held "that such a con-
tract, though binding on the company, is a fraud in law on its
creditors, which they can set aside; that when their rights inter-
vene and their claims are to be satisfied, the stockholders can
be required to pay their stock in full .... The reason is, that the
stock subscribed is considered in equity as a trust fund for the
payment of creditors .... It is so held out to the public, who have
no means of knowing the private contracts made between the
corporation and its stockholders. The creditor has, therefore,
the right to presume that the stock subscribed has been or will
be paid up, and if it is not, a court of equity will at his instance
require it to be paid." 5 The above quotation shows that the
trust fund theory makes no distinction between prior or subse-
quent creditors, or creditors with or without knowledge of the
watered nature of the stock. This doctrine simply states that the
issuance of watered stock is a fraud on all creditors, and stock-
holders will be required to make up the difference between the
purchase price and the par value.
The trust fund doctrine found much criticism among legal
scholars, 6 and gradually it fell into disrepute, with only a few
states still adhering to it.7 Many states modified the doctrine
into either the fraud theory8 or the statutory obligation theory.
B. The Fraud or Holding Out Theory
A notable example of the evolution of the trust fund theory
into the fraud theory appeared in the famous case of Handley v.
5. 105 U.S. 143, 154.
6. Bonbright, Shareholders' Defenses Against Liability to Creditors on
Watered Stock, 25 Col. L. Rev. 408 (1925); Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory and
some Substitutes for It, 12 Yale L.J. 63 (1902). Briefly, the basis of this
criticism is that where there is no unpaid subscription obligation to the
corporation there is actually nothing for the corporation to hold in trust.
The natural consequence of such an illogical situation was a resort to the
much censured use of fictions.
7. For late applications of the trust fund theory see cases in 11 Fletcher,
Cyclopedia on Corporations 577, n. 81 (1924).
8. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. and Car. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 197, 50 N.W.
1117, 1121, 15 L.R.A. 470, 474, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637, 646 (1892): "It is difficult
if not impossible, to explain or reconcile these cases upon the 'trust fund'
doctrine, or, in the light of them, to predicate the liability of the stock-
holder upon that doctrine. But by putting it upon the ground of fraud . . .
we have at once a rational and logical ground on which to stand. The
capital of a corporation is the basis of its credit. It is a substitute for the
individual liability of those who own its stock. People deal with it and give
it credit on the faith of it. They have a right to assume that it has paid in
capital to the amount which it represents itself as having; and if they give
it credit on the faith of that representation, and if the representation is false,
it Is fraud upon them ......
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Stutz.9 Here the court talked in terms of the trust fund theory,
but in its final disposition of the case held that the shareholders
were liable for the full par value to all those creditors who
become such subsequent to the issuance of the stock. By limit-
ing recovery to subsequent creditors, the court departed from
the trust fund theory and seemed to be approaching the fraud
theory of liability which requires a holding out of stock as fully
paid and reliance thereon by the creditor. Under this theory
only those creditors who are deceived are allowed to recover;' 0
thus the courts have held that anyone becoming a creditor before
the watered stock is issued cannot complain" nor can a subse-
quent creditor with notice of the watered stock situation.' 2
Unless there is actual knowledge, the subsequent creditor will
be presumed to have relied on the holding out.'3 Professor
Ballantine criticizes 4 the soundness of this doctrine by advanc-
ing the argument that public subscribers very seldom participate
'in any misrepresentation to creditors and "are usually themselves
victims of these frauds." Be that as it may, the fraud theory is
still followed by a majority of the states.
Although at first glance the fraud theory and the trust fund
theory seem to be somewhat similar, basically they are quite
different. The fraud doctrine approaches the problem from the
point of view that the stockholder has committed a fraud against
relying creditors by holding out the stock as fully paid. The
trust fund approach is that the agreement between the corpora-
tion and the shareholder limiting the latter's liability is void
because it is a constructive fraud on all creditors. The law there-
fore implies a promise on the part of the stockholder to make up
the unpaid portion.
C. The Statutory Obligation Theory
Because the legislation on this subject varies considerably,
it would not be practical to attempt to analyze the problem by
examining the statutes of all states which have adopted this
approach. However, a good example of an application of such
9. 139 U.S. 417 (1891).
10. Collier v. Edwards, 144 Okla. 69, 289 Pac. 260, 69 A.L.R. 874 (1930);
Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car. Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N.W. 1117, 15 L.R.A.
470, 31 Am. St. Rep. 637 (1892).
11. Fletcher, Cyclopedia on Corporations § 5238 (1924).
12. 139 U.S. 417 (1891).
13. R. H. Herron Co. v. Shaw, 165 Cal. 668, 133 Pac. 488 (1913).
14. Ballantine, Corporations 806 (rev. ed. 1927).
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a statute is shown in the case of DuPont v. Ball,15 where the court
said, "Our statute is very general in its language, and broad
enough to comprehend all claims that are legally and equitably
collectible. Under it the stockholder's liability is express and
unqualified; it makes no exception and recognizes no distinction
between creditors .... We are clearly of the opinion that mere
knowledge that stock issued as fully paid and nonassessable was
not in fact paid for, should not preclude the creditor from enforc-
ing the liability of the holder because the creditor may also know
or have good reason to believe that the holders of such stock
would be legally liable for the debts of the company to the
extent of the par value of their stock." 16
The result under this theory is that a shareholder is liable
for the full par value of his stock, and there is no distinction
between prior or subsequent creditors. The exponents of this
theory argue, "the capital stock of a corporation is the basis of
its credit, not because of actual reliance by creditors on the
precise amount of stock issued, but because the contributions
of the stockholders are the substitute for their personal liability.
It is not any misrepresentation of fact as to the amount of paid-
in capital which is the basis of liability, but the obligation
imposed by law on the stockholder to contribute capital as an
incident of membership in a limited liability corporation. This
obligation is in the nature of an asset of the corporation and
should be available to prior creditors and to subsequent creditors
with notice as well as to those whose debts were contracted after
the subscription without notice .. ." 17
II. THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA PRIOR TO 1928
Before the corporation act, Louisiana had only two written
laws dealing with watered stock, and for all practical purposes
these were identical. Article 266 of the Constitution of 189818
provided:
"Corporations shall not issue stock or bonds except for
labor done, or money or property actually received; and all
fictitious issues of stock shall be void; and any corporation
issuing such fictitious stock shall forfeit its charter."
15. 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 Atl. 39, 7 A.L.R. 955 (1918).
16. 11 Del. Ch. 430, 443, 106 Atl. 39, 45, 7 A.L.R. 955, 966 (1918).
17. Ballantine, Stockholders' Liability in Minnesota, 7 Minn. L. Rev. 79,
90 (1923).
18. Now La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 2.
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The similar statutory provision is found in Act 267 of 1914,
Section 20.
The early case of Belknap v. Adams 9 dealt with the situa'-
tion of the defendants' issuing to themselves $15,000 worth of
stock with no actual consideration being given therefor. In the
course of the decision the court stated: 20 "The liability of share-
holders to the corporation for their stock is treated as a trust
fund for creditors. . . . Nor is it of the least consequence that
there were no corporate creditors when that issue was made.
The shareholders' liability for unpaid stock received for [from]
the corporation is to future as well as existing creditors." From
this excerpt it can be seen that our court went along with a
majority of states at this time in predicating liability upon the
trust fund theory.
In the case of Dilzell Engineering and Construction Com-
pany v. Lehmann2 1 it was held that under Article 266 the value
of property or labor received in payment of stock must be equal
to the face value of the stock, and the stockholders were found
liable to the creditors of the insolvent corporation for the dif-
ference between the value of the property given in payment and
the par value of the shares of stock. The case of S. M. Jones
Company v. Home Oil and Development Company22 fell in line
with the reasoning of the foregoing cases. Here the receiver in
filing his provisional account did not include certain stockholder
creditors as entitled to participate in the sums he had recovered
from the same stockholder creditors, being the difference between
the amount paid for their stock and the par value. The stock-
holder creditors had been condemned by judgment to pay the
difference, and in this suit they were claiming as creditors the
return of part of this sum. The receiver contended that they
were properly excluded on the ground that they were estopped
because the stock was issued, to their knowledge, for less than
its par value. The receiver's contentions should have been sus-
tained had the court based liability on the fraud theory, but the
court held: 23 "It being settled that directors and stockholders
19. 49 La. Ann. 1350, 22 So. 382 (1897).
20. 49 La. Ann. 1350, 1353, 22 So. 382, 383.
21. 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138 (1907).
22. 124 La. 148, 49 So. 1009 (1909).
23. 124 La. 148, 151, 49 So. 1009, 1010. See also Webre v. Christ, 130 La.
450, 58 So. 145 (1912), which affirmed the Dilzell case and held that a receiver
representing the creditors had the right to show that shares given by the
defendant shareholders in payment of his stock subscription were of little
money value and that the defendant had not -paid for the stock.
1952]
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may become creditors and rank as to their claim the same as
any other creditors, we come next to the proposition that stock-
holder creditors, with full knowledge when they become cred-
itors that the stock of the corporation had been sold for less than
its par value, are not entitled to share in the proceeds. We do
not find it possible to agree with that view. They are creditors
despite the fact that they knew that the stock was issued for less
than par. We see no necessity for two classes of creditors, one
whose rights should be made to depend upon the fact that they
knew that stock had been issued for less than its par value, and
the other class without that knowledge .... And then, again, it
would be singular if a creditor owning only one share of little
value were excluded from participating in the disposition of the
trust fund although he might be a creditor for thousands of
dollars."
The trust fund theory seemed to be firmly established in
our jurisprudence by the decisions in the preceding cases. How-
ever, in 1922 the supreme court decided the case of Walmsley v.
Brothers,24 which contains dictum that appears to be out of line
with this doctrine. In this case the defendant shareholder was
being sued by the corporate receiver who was attempting to
collect for the corporation the difference between the par value
of the stock and the value of the services rendered by the defen-
dant. (There were no creditor's rights involved.) The court
held that the corporation did not have a valid claim against the
defendant, as there was no subscription contract between the
parties nor had the defendant committed an offense or quasi-
offense in accepting the shares. But the court went further than
necessary by discussing the meaning of Handley v. Stutz
25 in
relation to the Dilzell case26 and seemed to look with favor upon
the distinction between prior and subsequent creditors as made
in Handley v. Stutz. Although dictum, the court did show a ten-
dency to swing over to the fraud or holding out theory.
The last expression by our court on this problem may be
found in Rapides Grocery Company v. Grant.2 7 The supreme
court cited with approval the language of Webre v. Christ,
2 8
where it was said that under Article 266 the value of the property
24. 152 La. 148, 92 So. 766 (1922).
25. 139 U.S. 417 (1891)'. See note 8, supra.
26. 120 La. 273, 45 So. 138 (1907).
27. 165 La. 593, 115 So. 791 (1928).
28. 130 La. 450, 58 So. 145 (1912). See note 23, supra.
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or labor received in payment of a stock subscription must be
equal to the face value of the shares, and the stockholder is
liable to creditors for the difference between the value of the
property given in payment and the par value of the shares. In
the Grant case stock was issued in return for consideration con-
sisting of merchandise which was grossly inflated in value. The
court did not distinguish between prior or subsequent creditors;
but since the stock was issued shortly after the signing of the
charter, in all probability the creditors were subsequent. How-
ever, the court made no mention of this point or of the Walmsley
case and its possible effect on the prior jurisprudence.
III. THE LOUISIANA LAW TODAY
A. Which Theory Should Be Used by Our Courts Today?
The Louisiana law on the problem at hand is contained in
Article 13, Section 2,21 of the Constitution and in Sections 17 and
19 of the Business Corporation Act.30 As stated in the introduc-
tion, there have been no decisions on the question since the pas-
sage of the corporation act in 1928; therefore, we will have to
interpret these provisions without the benefit of recent juris-
prudence by the courts of this state.
In regard to Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution, it
has been stated31 that there are some twenty-seven states having
constitutional or statutory provisions similar to this article. What
exactly is the effect of such a provision declaring "all fictitious
issues of stock shall be void"? The Louisiana courts seem to hold
that the only effect of this section is to declare the contract void
as between the corporation and the shareholder, 2 but not to
affect any cause of action a creditor of the corporation might have
against the shareholder.3 3 This is the result reached by most of
the other states, 34 although a variety of approaches is used. Thus
29. La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIII, § 2, is set out under the preceding topic
as La. Const. (1898) Art. 266.
30. La. R.S. (1950) 12:17, 19.
31. Ettlinger v. Collins, 25 Ariz. 115, 213 Pac. 1002 (1923).
32. It has been held that a corporation cannot sue for the difference
between the value of services given and the par value (Walmsley v. Brothers,
152 La. 148, 92 So. 766 [1922]), although it might sue for a cancellation of the
shares, and the corporation cannot be estopped from asking for such a
cancellation (Mackie Pine Products v. Fredericks, 148 La. 687, 87 So. 712
[1921]).
33. Rapides Grocery v. Grant, 165 La. 593, 115 So. 791 (1928); Dilzell Engi-
neering & Const. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45 So. 1009 (1907).
34. See discussion in 35 Mich. L. Rev. 108 (1936). The Louisiana position
is set forth in Dilzell Engineering and Const. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 45
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it can be seen that Article XIII, Section 2, offers little help in
determining which of the three theories the courts will follow.
It certainly does not set forth any mandatory law on the subject,
and the courts would have a wide area in which to operate were
this the only law on the matter.
The solution as to which theory our courts will adopt when
allowing relief to creditors is rather definitely indicated by the
provision of Section 19C, that "Nothing in this Chapter shall
be construed as in derogation of any rights which any person
may by law have against an incorporator, subscriber, shareholder,
director, officer, or the corporation, because of any fraud prac-
ticed upon him by any of such persons or the corporation. . "
(Italics supplied.) Since this statute expressly mentions fraud,
and since Article XIII, Section 2, of the Constitution has never
been interpreted by the courts as a basis for the statutory obliga-
tion theory, it is unlikely that relief will be granted under that
doctrine.8 5 Therefore the problem narrows itself down to one of
whether the courts will retain the trust fund theory which was
used before the corporation act, or whether they will follow the
course of the majority of states by switching from the trust fund
theory to the fraud theory.
A basic argument in support of the trust fund theory has
been that the public has "no means of knowing the private con-
tracts made between the corporation and its stockholders." 86
This argument may be largely refuted today by pointing out that
Section 18 of the corporation act requires the filing of a report
and affidavit as to the consideration given for shares. Also, the
fact that most courts and scholars believe the trust fund theory
to be unsound would likely have persuasive effect on the Loui-
siana courts.
B. Test of Shareholder's Liability in Overvaluation Cases
Turning to the related problem of the valuation of services
So. 138 (1907), where it was stated that as between the stockholder and the
creditors, the former are estopped from setting up the nullity. For another
approach see Scully v. Automobile Finance Co., 12 Del. Ch. 174, 109 AtI. 49
(1930).
35. 9 U.L.A. 96 (1951), the Commissioner's note sustains this observation:
"There is no statutory liability imposed upon the shareholders either toward
the corporation or toward the creditors of the corporaton. Why should there
be liability to a corporate creditor who knows of the fact of overvaluation?
Undoubtedly, a creditor might work a right in deceit based on the intentional
false representations made by a shareholder. Such a liability is not negatived
by anything in this act."
36. Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 154 (1881).
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or property for determining liability to creditors, '87 there are two
standards in general use-the "true value" rule and the "good
faith" rule. By the true value rule a stockholder must give prop-
erty or services actually equal to the par value of the stock, and
good faith or an honest mistake will not be a defense. Under
the good faith rule a valuation will be conclusive if the parties
deal at arm's length and there is no intentional overvaluation.
A few of the jurisdictions following the good faith rule hold
that a shareholder will be liable if he does not exercise reason-
able care. Before the passage of the corporation act in 1928,
the Supreme Court of Louisiana made use of the true value rule
at least once.8 As to which standard the Louisiana courts will
use today, an answer can best be formulated by analogizing from
Section 20, which holds responsible for overvaluation only those
"incorporators, shareholders, or directors ... who knowingly, or
without the exercise of due and reasonable care and inquiry,
consented to or voted in favor thereof." (Italics supplied.) It
should be noted that "shareholders" as used in the section refers
to shareholders as a group, which in some instances may be
charged with the duty of valuation, and does not refer to the
purchaser of the stock.89 Since Section 20 requires only due care
on the part of incorporators, shareholders, or directors, it would
hardly seem equitable to hold the person purchasing the stock
to a greater degree of care than the corporate representatives
with whom he deals. Hence, the true value rule, which imposes
strict liability, would not seem appropriate. Turning then to the
good faith rule, a question arises as to whether the courts will
hold the stockholder to the same degree of care as the corporate
37. The valuation problem in regard to the stockholder's obligation to
the corporation should be distinguished from the valuation problem in deter-
mining liability to creditors. The answer to the former is found in La. R.S.
(1950) 12:17.
.38. Rapides Grocery Co. v. Grant, 165 La. 593, 115 So. 791 (1928). In this
case the court quoted as follows from 14 C.J. 961, which is in the section
entitled "The True Value Rule": "By this rule, with slight qualifications in
some states, one who subscribes for or receives stock of a corporation must
pay therefor the par value thereof, either in money or money's worth, so
that the real assets of the corporation, at the outset, at least, shall square
with its books; and therefore, whenever, whether by fraud, accident or mis-
take, the true value of the property, labor or services received in payment
does not equal the par value of the stock, it is deemed unpaid to the full
extent of the difference, and the holders are liable to or for the benefits of
creditors of the corporation for this difference." See also Dilzell Engineering
and Const. Co. v. Lehmann, 120 La. 273, 284, 45 So. 138, 142 (1907): "While
it is not here said expressly that, the value of the labor or property received
in payment of the stock must be equal to the face value of the stock, that is
the idea meant to be conveyed."
39. This observation is borne out by La. R.S. (1950) 12:20(c).
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representative, that is, to require due care as to the valuation
(which is the minority good faith rule); or whether the stock-
holder will be liable only if there is an intentional overvaluation
(the majority rule). We have very little on which to make a
prediction, and since it is not within the scope of this comment
to go. into the relative merits of allowing the action of deceit to
include negligence, a definite conclusion on this controversial
issue40 will not be attempted.41 However, it is submitted that
under the present laws of this state, either of the good faith rules
of valuation coupled with the fraud or holding out doctrine
(although itself not flawless in theory) presents a more logical
approach to the determination of creditors' remedies against
holders of watered stock than the previously used true value
and trust fund theories.
J. Noland Singletary
40. Prosser, A Handbook of the Law of Torts § 87 (1941).
41. The Commissioner's Note at 9 U.L.A. 97 (1951) takes the position that
"a creditor might work out a right in deceit based on the intentional false
representations made by a shareholder." (Italics supplied.) From this it
would seem that the majority good faith rule of valuation would combine
better with the fraud theory than the minority rule.
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